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MEANINGFUL ADOPTION: WHAT WE KNow
OR THINK WE KNow ABOUT THE FINANCING,
EFFECTIVENESS, QUALITY, AND SAFETY OF
ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS
Nicolas P. Terry'
What is clear is that electronic medical records facilitate documentation of services
rendered by physicians and hospitals, which is used to justify billing. Doctors in
particular are burdened with checking off scores of boxes on the computer screen to
satisfy insurance requirements, so called "pay for performance." But again, there are
no compelling data to demonstrate that such voluminous documentation translates
into better outcomes for their sick patients.
When doctors and hospitals use health IT, patients get better care and we save money.
... We're making great progress, but we can't wait to do more. Too many doctors and
hospitals are still using the same record-keeping technology as Hippocrates. Today,
we are making it easier for health care providers to use new technology to improve
the health care system for all of us and create more jobs.2
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The current state of the implementation of health information technology
(HIT) and its progeny, such as the electronic medical record (EMR), is opaque.
Given the amount of federal money being pumped into HIT adoption courtesy
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), it is hardly
surprising that the government's HIT leaders frequently seek out a positive
statistic to support their optimistic public comments about the state of the
current initiative. Equally, industry stakeholders, whether they are physicians
or hospitals looking to receive government meaningful use (MU) subsidies or
HIT vendors filling orders for certifiable EMRs, make supportive, progressive
noises.
Both before and during the course of this technological promotion, the
overwhelming majority of commentators have taken the position that EMRs
will solve many, if not all, of healthcare's quality and efficiency woes.3 This
article takes a more critical stance. It argues that increasingly there are grounds
to doubt that conventional wisdom and suggest that the impact of EMRs may
be relatively minor, particularly in the short term. The article also discusses
a related argument, that the current generation of EMRs may not be capable
of promoting major safety or quality gains because of problems with their
usability, technological limitations that impede interoperability, and concerns
about their safety. Taken together these observations cast some doubt on
the current market failure-subsidy model. Is it possible that the market has
actually been functioning perfectly well because many providers do not see
sufficient value in the current generation of the technology? If so, the exception
may prove the rule, that only well-funded large systems with strong integrative
skills or vertically integrated providers can effectively leverage this generation
of EMR technology.
Part I tells the generally negative story of EMR adoption prior to the MU
program. The MU program is described in Part II with particular emphasis
given to the new Stage 2 rule. Part III pivots to a more critical and central
analysis by posing the question whether the MU program has (or will) result in
3 See, e.g., Barry R. Furrow, Adverse Events and Patient Injury: Coupling Detection, Disclosure, and
Compensation, 46 NEw ENG. L. REV. 437 (2012); Leslie Pickering Francis, The Physician-Patient
Relationship and a National Health Information Network, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHics 36 (2010); Laura
Ashpole, Health Information Technology: Building the Foundation for the Reconstruction of Health
Care Delivery, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 32 (2011); Susan R. Gering, Electronic Health Records: How to
Avoid Digital Disaster, 16 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 297 (2012); Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski,
Improving Health Care Outcomes through Personalized Comparisons of Treatment Effectiveness Based
on Electronic Health Records, 39 J.L. MED. & Emics 425 (2011). This author is similarly guilty. See,
e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, Certification and Meaningful Use: Reframing Adoption of Electronic Health
Records as a Quality Imperative, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 43 (2011); Nicolas Terry, To HIPAA, a Son:
Assessing the Technical, Conceptual, and Legal Frameworks for Patient Safety Information, 12 WIDENER
L. REv. 134 (2006).
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meaningful adoption. Part IV casts the critical net more broadly, speculating
about the quality failures and safety externalities of the current generation of
EMRs.
At the heart of this story are the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS) and the Office of the National Coordinator for Health In-
formation Technology (ONC). These two Health and Human Services (HHS)
agencies control the subsidy program via the MU and certification regulations.
The article concludes that the progress seen so far is somewhat pedestrian and
that trajectory will continue until CMS and ONC demand more sophisticated
utilization of HIT in exchange for the MU subsidy funds.
I. HISTORY, CULTURE, MARKET FAILURE, AND SUBSIDY
IBM had a primitive experimental computer-based records system run-
ning at Akron Children's Hospital in 1962.4 However, it was Dr. Lawrence
Weed who became known as the "father of the problem-oriented medical
record" through his work at the University of Vermont beginning in 1969.'
Beginning in the 1970s, the Regenstrief Institute at Indiana University School
of Medicine developed an EMR system and, in 1994, the Indiana Network
for Patient Care became the first major interoperable network.6 For over four
decades, advances were made across many HIT fronts by a large number of tal-
ented researchers typically supported by the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (AHRQ) and its predecessor agencies.'
Policymakers entered the debate because of the normative claims of a
1997 Institute of Medicine (loM) report. That report, The Computer-Based
Patient Record, provided a roadmap for the future development and imple-
mentation of EMRs.' By 2005, its financial model was moved forward by a
4 Steve Lohr, The "Miracle" of Digital Health Records, 50 Years Ago, N.Y Times, Feb. 17, 2012,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/the-miracle-of-digital-health-records-50-years-ago/.
Lawrence L. Weed, Medical Records That Guide and Teach, 278 NEw ENG. J. MED. 593 (1968),
available at http://imed.stanford.edu/curriculum/session7/content/NEJM%20-%20Medical%20
record%20 that%20guide%20and%20teach%20(Weed%20-%201968).pdf. "It can readily be seen that
all narrative data presently in the medical record can be structured, and in the future all narrative data
may be entered through series of displays, guaranteeing a thoroughness, retrieveability, efficiency and
economy important to the scientific analysis of a type of datum that has hitherto been handled in a very
unrigorous manner." Id.
Regenstrief Inst., Inc., INPC History, Indiana Network for Patient Care, http://www.regenstrief.org/
medinformatics/inpc/hi story- 1.
J. Michael Fitzmaurice et al., Three Decades of Research on Computer Applications in Health
Care: Medical Informatics Support at the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 9 J. AM.
MED. INFORMATIcs Ass'N 144, 144 (2002), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC344572/
pdf/0090144.pdf.
See Comm. on Improving the Patient Record Div. of Health Care Serv., Inst. Med. (Richard S. Dick
et al. eds., revised ed. 2007).
9
TERRY
report from the RAND HIT project that connected broad EMR implemen-
tation to annual savings of $81 billion from improved healthcare efficiency
and safety.9 And, Crossing the Quality Chasm," the loM's sequel to To Err Is
Human," contained the clear directive that, "IT must pay a central role in the
redesign of the health care system if a substantial improvement in health care
quality is to be achieved during the coming decade" and that "[a]utomation
of clinical, financial, and administrative transactions is essential to improv-
ing quality, preventing errors, enhancing consumer confidence in the health
system, and improving efficiency." 2
The political history of EMRs began in 2004 when President G.W. Bush
announced: "Within 10 years, we want most Americans to have electronic
health care records-that means your records.... You not only save money,
you improve the quality of care through the spread of good information." 3
The President proceeded to set up ONC under Dr. David Brailer. Brailer and
his team embarked on a two-pronged strategy, working with standards bodies
and the health care industry to sort out the technical standards for information
exchange and simultaneously using the power of the bully pulpit to urge
providers and the HIT industry toward implementation. 4
The pioneering efforts of researchers, policymakers, and government
alike were wasted as the health care system persisted with paper records.
Worse, paper records were interred in physician offices. This trapping of pa-
tient information in archetypal data siloes impeded continuity of care and
promoted expensive multiple, duplicative tests. In parallel, retention of paper
media led to errors in recording patient information and medication pre-
scribing errors. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich was forthright about
continued use of paper, stating: "You show me a paper medical record, and I'll
tell you about the 44,000 to 98,000 Americans who are killed every year by
preventable medical errors. You show me a paper prescription, and I'll tell you
about the more than 7,000 Americans who die every year from unnecessary
medication errors." 5
9 Richard Hillestad et al., Can Electrnic Medical Record Systems Transform Health Care? Potential
Health Benefits, Savings, and Costs, 24 Health Affairs 1103, 1103 (2005).
10 COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Ist ed. 2001).
COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INsT. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH
SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
CoMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE, supra note 10, at 16.
George W. Bush, Addressing Vanderbilt University Medical Center, President Discusses Transforming
Health Care for Americans with Health IT (May 27, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/ 2004/05/20040527-5.html.
14
See generally Terry, To HIPAA, supra note 3.
Newt Gingrich, Preface to the First Edition, Ctr. for Health Transformation, PAPER KILLS (David Merritt
ed., Ist ed. 2007).
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Of course, the cost-benefit picture is considerably more muddled. The
previously cited RAND study estimate of savings became part of the mythol-
ogy of EMRs even though the study itself cautioned that a saving of that
magnitude was heavily contingent on other major reforms.'I Although EMRs
have little impact on diagnostic errors, claims that predict EMRs will result
in reductions in adverse results and avoidable adverse results, particularly
medication errors, are generally viewed as accurate. 7 Still, further claims of
cost savings are made on the basis of better coordination of care, the elim-
ination of duplicate tests, increased patient engagement and all manner of
other cost reductions. Looking further into the future, cost savings of a greater
order of magnitude are the promised result of analysis of EMR data regarding
outcomes and effectiveness. Even greater savings may be forthcoming from
data-fueled public health, pharmaceutical and genomic research. Claims in
the aggregate aside, it has always been a struggle to establish the positive
effect of HIT investment on the bottom line of individual providers. Many
apparent benefits are indirect and others depend on providers implementing
not only EMRs, but also a broader suite of HIT technologies.
The costs side of the ledger is no less tentative. Some estimates have sug-
gested a total of $400 billion for a full national, longitudinal records system."
In 2005, a study by the Commonwealth Fund estimated a $44,000 initial cost
per physician in small group or solo practices. 9 Like the RAND study esti-
mate of benefits, this expenditure number became part of HIT lore and was the
figure used to set the maximum MU (Medicare) subsidy.20 Estimating the total
cost of ownership, such as hardware and software updates, personnel, training,
and technical support, has also been difficult (although the Commonwealth
Fund report in 2005 estimated $8,500 per physician in annual costs for small
group or solo practices).2 ' If anything, the negative side of the ledger has more
indeterminacies than the benefits side.
6 Hillestad et al., supra note 9, at 1107 ("Achieving savings at the upper end of the range will be limited
by the degree of transformation that accompanies HIT").
See, e.g., Jerome Groopman & Pamela Hartzband, Mindfid Medicine: Critical Thinking Leads to
Right Diagnosis, ACP ITERNIST (2008), http://www.acpinternist.org/archives/2008/01/groopman.htm.
("While electronic medical records and other computer-based systems are certainly useful, to date,
studies have not shown a robust benefit with regard to reducing the rate of misdiagnosis").
18Rainu Kaushal et al., The Costs ofa National Health Information Network, 143 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
165, 165 (2005).
19 Robert H. Miller et al., The Value of Electronic Health Records in Solo or Small Group Practices, 24
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1127,1130(2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/24/5/l127.
20
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PUB. No. 903695, MEDICARE ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD





Precise financials aside, the imperative of EMR implementation seldom
has been challenged.2 2 Yet, progress has been disappointing. In 2010 Dr.
David Blumenthal, who was President Obama's first head of ONC, decried:
"We have years of professional agreement and bipartisan consensus regarding
the potential value of EHRs. Yet we have not moved significantly to extend
the availability of EHRs from a few large institutions to the smaller clinics and
practices where most Americans receive their health care." 23 This disconnect
between aspiration and implementation is a function of cultural barriers and
chronic market failures.
Cultural barriers are complex. They can encompass demographic char-
acteristics, such as age or gender, or even preferences among doctors about
methods of data entry.24 Objections also may reflect technophobia and oc-
casionally are attempts to hide protectionism (such as when technology like
telemedicine threatens geographically-based markets). Objectively there are
many reasons to support HIT. However, generational and other barriers can
get in the way. An Accenture study found that doctors under 50 years old
generally believe that HIT has a positive impact on care than their more senior
colleagues. 25 A Deloitte survey found similar differentials based not only on
age, but also on size of practice. 26 Respondents cited cost and operational
disruption as the major barriers to HIT adoption.2 7
The Accenture research also found that of the eight developed coun-
tries surveyed, the U.S. had significantly lower percentages of doctors who
believed HIT improves diagnoses, health outcomes or quality of treatment
decisions. 28 The U.S. health care establishment does appear to be uncomfort-
able with innovation and views technologically mediated care as related to
the industrialization of medicine. Physicians themselves remain antithetical
22
See, e.g., JANET M. COFFMAN ET AL., ON THE ROAD TO MEANINGFUL USE OF EHRs: A SURVEY OF CALIFOR-
NIA PHYSICIANS 6 (2012), available at http://www.chcf.org/-/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%2OFiles/
PDF/R/PDF%20RoadMeaningfulUseEHRsPhysicians.pdf (noting that "[EHRs] can facilitate improve-
ment in coordination of care, patient safety, quality management, outcomes reporting, and provider
efficiency").
23 David Blumenthal & Marilyn Tavenner, The "Meaningful Use" Regulation for Electronic Health
Records, 363 NEw ENG. J. MED. 501 (2010), available at http://www.nejm.org/doilfull0.1056/
NEJMpl006114.
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Linder et al., Method of Electronic Health Record Documentation and Quality of
Primary Care, J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS Ass'N, May 19, 2012, available at doi: 10.11 36/amiajnl-201 I-
000788.
Press Release, Accenture, Doctors Agree on Top Healthcare IT Benefits, but Generational Divide
Exists, According to Accenture Eight-Country Survey (Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://newsroom.
accenture.com/article-display.cfm?articleJd=5370.
DELOfffE CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, PHYSICIAN PERSPECTIVES ABOUT HEALTH INFORMATION TECH-
NOLOGY 1, 3 (2012), http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/
Health%20Reform%20Issues%20Briefs/us-chs-hysicianPerspectivesAboutHIT-021612.pdf.
27 Id. at 4.
28 Accenture, supra note 25.
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to performing HIT tasks they have traditionally viewed as staff tasks. Mean-
while, organizations such as the American Medical Association (AMA) are
quick to criticize changes that may lead to the commodification of heretofore
"professional" skills as industrial models increase pressure to broaden the
scope of practice for non- or paraprofessionals.2 9
However, it is market failures (primarily misaligned incentives and as-
sociated information asymmetries) that typically are cited as responsible for
impeding HIT development. Christensen and Remler identify several failures
common to general IT adoption, such as low product differentiation, training
costs, switching costs, and the need for interoperability between interlinked
or dependent technologies." However, they argue: "[F]antastic gains of [IT]
have outweighed those barriers in most industries and aspects of both public
and private life. Why does health care [IT] lag so far behind?"3 ' One answer
is patient heterogeneity.3 2 Going down that imperfect information road also
implicates provider heterogeneity."
Christensen and Remler's primary target is market failure due to mis-
aligned incentives.3 Healthcare markets generally are infamous for separating
out those who pay (insurers), those who recommend treatment (providers),
and those who experience treatment (patients). The EMR problem is a variant
on this narrative. Although insurers and patients welcome EMRs, providers
are the ones who must pay. If nothing else, this explains why vertically inte-
grated providers (merging as they do the insurance and care functions) appear
disproportionately on lists of those who have successfully implemented com-
prehensive EMRs."
Only a few years into the Bush initiative it became clear that continu-
ing market failure would overwhelm both the Administration's cheerleading
29 Cf Randall Stross, Advice for the Ill, and Points for the Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/02/05/business/on-healthtap-advice-for-you-and-points-for-doctors.html?-r=1 &
(AMA president criticizing online physician advice site: "[A] medical history is not taken, a phys-
ical exam does not occur and any suggested treatment is not monitored or assessed.... Using this
information in isolation could pose a threat to patients.").
Michael C. Christensen & Dahlia Remler, Information and Communications Technology in U.S. Health
Care: Why Is Adoption So Slow and Is Slower Better?, 34 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL'Y & L. 1011, 1014-15
(Dec. 2009).
Id. at 1016-17.
32 Id. at 1017-19.
Cf PAUL G. SHEKELLE, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, EVIDENCE REPORT/TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT: COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HEALTH INFORMATlON TECHNOLOGY 132 (2006), available at http://
www.ahrq.gov/downloads/pub/evidence/pdf/hitsyscosts/hitsys.pdf ("[W]idespread implementation of
HIT has been limited by a lack of generalizable knowledge about what types of HIT and implementation
methods will improve care and manage costs for specific health organizations").
34Christensen & Remler, supra note 30, at 1011.
Cf COFFMAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 14 (reporting that a survey of Californian physicians found that
99% of Kaiser physicians and 93% of VA or military physicians had access to an EMR and that those
were generally capable of more comprehensive use/tasks).
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and important technical standards work. By March 2006, the General Ac-
counting Office was openly critical of ONC's progress.36 Two months later,
Dr. Brailer resigned to head up an HIT venture capital firm." In 2007, a
disapproving Congress once again slashed the Coordinator's budget and the
House Appropriations Committee concluded that ONCHIT had "yet to de-
velop a detailed and integrated implementation plan for achieving the health
IT program's strategic goals."3 8 By 2007, the Bush Administration had lost its
enthusiasm for the EHR project and pivoted toward Consumer-Driven Health
Care (CDHC) and its electronics records analog known as the Personal Health
Record (PHR).3 9
Notwithstanding the Bush Administration initiative, by 2009, only 1.5%
of U.S. hospitals had a comprehensive electronic-records system, while 7.6%
had installed a basic system; computerized provider-order entry for medica-
tions was implemented in only 17% of hospitals.4 0
II. THE MEANINGFUL USE SUBSIDY PROGRAM
In the battle against presumed market failure, subsidy was one of the few
levers that had not been tried.4 ' Yet subsidy was considered highly unlikely,
and even politically impossible.4 2 Then the recession of the late 2000s hit
hard and ARRA included funding for the Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) and that legislation's MU
subsidy program.4 3
36 Health Information Technology: HHS Is Continuing Efforts to Define a National Strategy, Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Federal Workforce and Agency Organization of the H. Comm. on Government
Reform, 109th Cong. 16 (2006) (Statement of David A. Powner, Dir. Information Tech. Mgmt. Issues),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/113041.pdf.
Joseph Conn, Brailer's Firm to Invest $700 Million from CalPERS, MODERN HEALTHCARE (June 6,
2007), http://www.modernhealthcare.conlarticle/20070606/INFO/70606006.
Zach Brennan, Funding Issues Add to Doubts about Future of Health IT Office, IHEALTHBEAT (Sept.
20, 2007), http://www.ihealthbeat.org/Features/2007/Funding-Issues-Add-To-Doubts-About-Future-
of-Health-IT-Office.aspx.
3 9 See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health Records: Directing More Costs and Risks to Con-
sumers?, I DREXEL L. REv. 216 (2009).
4 0Ashish K. Jha et al., Use of Electronic Health Records in U.S. Hospitals, 360 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1628
(2009).
41 See generally Roger Taylor et al., Promoting Health Information Technology: Is There a Case for
More-Aggressive Government Action?, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1234 (2005).
42 J.D. Kleinke, Dot-Gov: Market Failure and the Creation of a National Health Information Technology
System, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1246, 1257-58 (2005). "The federal government can and should write the
huge check and be done with it. ... [WIriting a check for a quarter of a trillion dollars is pure political
fantasy. The very idea of a public works project sounds like an artifact from an era eclipsed by nearly
three decades of hostility toward government-based solutions to domestic problems, combined with a
seemingly religious belief in marketplace solutions for all of them." Id.
43 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R. 1, 11 th Cong. § 3005 (2009), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= I1 1congbills&docid=f:h lenr.pdf.
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HITECH provided for a newly energized and powerful ONC along with
approximately $30 billion in funds for HHS. The majority of those funds were
to be dispensed by CMS as staged subsidy payments," with the remainder
available to ONC to provide support, education, and regional grants and loans
deigned to promote information exchange.4 5 This section briefly explains the
MU program and its escalating "stage" requirements before detailing the
Stage 2 process and requirements and the difficulties the latter pose for some
providers.
A. Meaningful Use of Certified Records Technology
As is well known, the core subsidy program, contingent on recipients'
satisfaction with MU, provides Medicare incentive payments to non-hospital-
based doctors of up to $44,000 over 5 years. Medicaid providers (qualified
on the basis of a needy patient floor) qualify for up to $63,750 over 6 years.4 6
Approximately 500,000 doctors are eligible. Hospitals will generally qualify
for subsidies starting at a $2 million baseline with additional sums qualified
based on the number of inpatient discharges. 47 It is estimated that a 500-bed
hospital would receive $6.1 million in incentives.48 There are approximately
5000 eligible institutions.
The subsidy process operationalized requires that providers register for
the program,4 9 make meaningful use of certified EHR technology, and then
attest"o to such qualifying use. Even when all steps are satisfied, the program
will not pay the full cost of a provider's EMR program. It is estimated that
"US hospitals will need to spend approximately $120 billion" while the ARRA
44 Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, EHR Incentive Programs (Aug. 27, 2012), https://www.
cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRlncentivePrograms/index.html?redirect=/EHR
IncentivePrograms/.
45 Office of the Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Technology, ONC Initiatives, U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs. (Dec. 7, 2011), http://healthit.hhs.gov/portaUserver.pt/community/healthit-hhs-gov
oncinitiatives/1497; see generally David Blumenthal, Launching HITECH, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 382
(2010); PwC Health Research Inst., Rock and a Hard Place 2 (Apr. 2009), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/
healthcare/publications/rock- and-a- hard-place.jhtml.
4See generally Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incen-
tive Programs Basics (Aug. 27, 2012), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/
EHRIncentivePrograms/Basics.html.
47 Id.
48 See generally Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 45, at 3, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/healthcare/
publications/rock-and-a-hard-place.jhtml; Jaime Oh, Lawmakers Introduce Bill That Would Increase
Meaningful Use Incentive Payments for Multi-Campus Hospitals, BECKER'S Hosp. REV. (Jul. 14,
2011), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-information-technology/lawmakers-introdu
ce-bill-that- would- increase- meaningful-use-incentive-payments-for-multi-campus- hospitals.html.
See generally Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, Registration & Attestation




subsidies will "offset only approximately 15 to 20 percent of total expenditures
a spending gap of about $60,000 to $80,000 a bed."5 '
The subsidy offer has a limited window after which carrots are replaced
by sticks. The amount qualified for declines as doctors and institutions hold
off on attempting to qualify. Generally, providers needed to register in 2011 or
2012 to claim the maximum subsidy. Thus, 2013 physician latecomers would
be eligible for a maximum of $39,000 and the class of 2014 for only $24,000.52
Furthermore, in 2015, Medicare providers who are not meaningful users will
be the first to see their government program payments reduced.
An obvious question is why the HHS agencies did not provide all of
the subsidy moneys in a single payment. Simply put (and consistent with
HITECH's statutory mandate), ONC leadership decided that simple EMR
adoption should not be the defacto goal of the project but the means to more
ambitious ends. To achieve this, the Administration decided to use an esca-
lation model starting modestly and making staged payments dependent on
provider progress. Dr. Blumenthal illustrates this with an escalator metaphor:
"We have to get providers on the escalator, get them moving up the esca-
lator, keep them on the escalator toward more and more sophisticated and
demanding uses of electronic technologies." 4 However, a secondary reason
for choosing an escalation model was that the Administration's ambitions for
MU went beyond EMR adoption to changing the culture of U.S. healthcare
with deep penetration of HIT. As Dr. Blumenthal noted: "[W]e ... don't want
the escalator to turn into one of those airport moving walkways where you
end up after [a] long trip at precisely the same altitude as where you started.""
B. A Staged Approach and the MU Matrix
Once HHS decided to use an escalation model, the MU program
was designed around "stages."" Three stages have been announced with a
hint of a fourth.5 7 Early registrants would face a relatively gentle slope of
5 McKinsey on Business Technology, 20 McKINSEY & Co. 28 (Nov. 20,2010), http://www.ortechsystems.
com/pdfs/MRreformingHospitalslTinvestment.pdf.
5 2Medicare Electronic Health Record Incentive Program for Eligible Professionals (Nov. 2012),
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/
downloads/CMS-eHR-Tip-Sheet.pdf.
CMS Medicare and Medicaid HER Incentive Programs Milestone Timeline (Aug. 27, 2012),
https://www.cms.gov / Regulations-and-Guidance / Legislation / EHRIncentivePrograms / Downloads/
EHRlncentProgtimeline508V 1.pdf.
Hannah Fishman, A Discussion with National Health Information Technology Coordinator David Blu-
menthal, BuRNEss COMM'N (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.bumesscommunications.com/burness-effect/
2010/4/20/discussion- national-health- information- technology-coordinator-david-blument.
Id.
5 6Terry, Certification, supra note 3, at 50-51.
57 Id. at 55.
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implementation with subsequent stages increasing in difficulty." Registrants
who later join face initial compliance with the more demanding criteria."
While MU requirements are directed at health care providers, the
program's complementary certification standards are aimed at technology
vendors.' ONC provides both certification standards and a process whereby
vendors can have their products certified.6 1 Not surprisingly, specifications
include the ability to record and chart vital signs, the maintenance of active
medication and allergy lists, the ability to include laboratory test results, and
the capability to generate lists of patients with specific conditions.62
The MU criteria (appropriately referred to as the MU matrix, one axis
of which is the three-stage implementation timeline) are the outcome goals
dictated by the HITECH legislation.6 3 Those goals are: (1) improving the
quality, safety, and efficiency of care while reducing disparities; (2) engag-
ing patients and families in their care; (3) promoting public and popula-
tion health; (4) improving care coordination; and (5) promoting EMR pri-
vacy and security.' "Objectives" are a large number of sub-goals derived
from those broad HITECH outcome goals.65 Examples (in Stage 1) under
the quality-safety-efficiency goal included the maintenance of a list of the
patient's active medications and recording smoking status. Under patient
engagement, a Stage 1 objective was the provision of clinical summaries for
patients after office visits. 67
"Measures" are the reporting metrics that signify a level of compliance
by the provider with the objective. 68 For instance a Stage 1 measure for the
objective of generating prescriptions electronically was that more than 40%
of the provider's prescriptions were transmitted electronically. 69 Measures are
now more routinely normalized around a denominator-numerator-threshold




61 Id. at 58.
See Health Information Technology: Initial Set of Standards, Implementation Specifications, and Certi-
fication Criteria for Electronic Health Record Technology, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,590,44,600 (July 28, 2010)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-07-28/pdf/
2010-17210.pdf.
63
Terry, Certification, supra note 3, at 51.
See Medicare and Medicaid Programs, Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, Final Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 44,314, 44,321 (July 28, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 412, 413, 422), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-07-28/pdf/2010-17207.pdf.
Terry, Certification, supra note 3, at 51.
Id. at 55-56.
See Final Rule, supra note 64, at 44,314, 44,370 (Table 2: "Stage I Meaningful Use Objectives and
Associated Measures Sorted by Core and Menu Set").
65See Blumenthal, supra note 45; see also Terry, Certification, supra note 3, at 51.
69 Terry, Certification, supra note 3, at 51.
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scans, the numerator the number of such scans accessible from the EHR,
and the threshold 40%)."0 To provide flexibility and help keep the escalation
slope shallow, providers were given some choices as to where to put their
energies." Thus, Objectives were classified as either "Core" or "Menu."7 2
While (in Stage 1) providers had to comply with 15 Core requirements, they
could choose which of 5 out of 10 Menu Objectives they would comply with."
Providers were also given the approximation of a "get out of jail free card"
with "Exclusions," which waived compliance of certain Objectives.74
C. Escalating Requirements in Stages 1 and 2
Many providers have faced significant barriers in their quest for subsidy
payments." Hospitals have cited "understanding the requirements involved in
demonstrating meaningful use" as the greatest barrier followed by "training
and change management efforts," "capturing the relevant data electronically
as part of clinical workflows," the lack of a dedicated meaningful use team,
and "not having the appropriate certified technology.""
Although only a minority of hospitals and health systems were confident
that they would meet Stage 1 requirements, HHS has pushed ahead and
published its Meaningful Use Stage 2 rule." True to the "escalator" model,
Stage 2 increases the angle of ascent from Stage I while providing softer
landings for providers late to the party or facing particular difficulties. Thus,
most providers now have two years in each Stage.7 9
7042 C.F.R. § 495.6(e)(2) (i) (2012).
n Terry, Certification, supra note 3, at 53-54.
7 Id. at 53.
73Id.
74 Id. at 54.
Id. at 66.
76 "Meaningful Use" Requirements Seen as Compliance Challenge, Despite High Hospital EHRAdoption
Rates, Says KPMG Poll, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/
meaningful- use-requirements- seen- as-compliance-challenge-despite- high-hospital-ehr- adoption-rat
es-says-kpmg-poll- 148662355.html.
7 Id.
Forty-eight percent of hospital and health system business leaders who participated in a KPMG
poll last month said they were confident in their organization's level of readiness to meet Stage
I meaningful use requirements. Thirty-nine percent said they were somewhat confident, three
percent said they were not confident at all, and 10 percent didn't know what their level of
readiness was.
Id.
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health
Record Incentive Program-Stage 2, 77 Fed. Reg. 53,967 (Sept. 4, 2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
parts 412,413, and 495), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-09-04/pdf/2012-21050.
pdf.
77 Fed. Reg. at 53,970.
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In the Stage 2 rule, CMS retained the basic three-stage model together
with the goals-objectives-measures matrix.so Stage 2 also kept the core-menu
distinction for some objectives."' However, this is tightened up.8 2 Whereas
Stage 1 criteria were satisfied by compliance with all 15 core and 5 out of
10 menu objectives, Stage 2 requires EP compliance with 17 core objectives
and 3 out of 6 menu objectives.83 New menu objectives introduced by Stage
2 include recording family health history and reporting cancer cases to state
cancer agencies.8 4 Measures are generally increased; for example the 30%
measure for using CPOE to order medications increases to 60%."
The Stage 2 rule retains most of the Stage 1 objectives and measures.8 6
The major changes are to the "exchange" objective which has been replaced by
a new "transitions of care" objective, albeit using a "summary of care" model."
The Stage I objective of supplying patients with electronic copies of their
health information has been superseded by the online "view and download"
objective." Additionally some Stage 1 objectives have been combined into
Stage 2 objectives or otherwise tweaked.8 9 Stage 1's "proof of concept" Public
Health Reporting morphs into "successful ongoing submission."9 0
Finally, Stage 2 ramps up the level and sophistication of reporting clinical
quality measures, aligning the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative, and re-
porting associated with Accountable Care Organizations and Patient-Centered
Medical Homes.9 ' Overall, Robert Kocher and Bryan Roberts summarized
Stage 2 as involving three "transformative" requirements, standardization of
data formats for data capture and sharing, patient access and downloading,
and quality reporting.9 2
Between the publication of the proposed and final Stage 1 MU rule, HHS
gave up considerable ground on the number of mandatory objectives and their
measures.9 3 This led Ezekiel Emanuel to comment:
8 Id.
81 Id.
82 See generally Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic
Health Record Incentive Program-Stage 2, 77 Fed. Reg. 53,967.
8 77 Fed. Reg. at 53,970 (16 core objectives and 2 out of 6 menu objectives for hospitals).
Id. at 54,021.
Id. at 54,048 (Table B5).
86See generally Jane Metzger, Moving Ahead with Stage 2 of Meaningful Use, CSC's GLOBAL INSTITUTE
FOR EMERGING HEALTHCARE PRACTICES (May 2012), http://assetsl.csc.com/health-services/downloads/
CSC.Moving-Ahead-withStage.2-of-MeaningfuLUse.pdf.
8777 Fed. Reg. at 53,970.
Id.
89 Id.
9Id. at 54,048 (Table B5).
91 Id. at 53,970.
92 Robert Kocher & Bryan Roberts, Meaningful Use of Health IT Stage 2: The Broader Mean-
ing, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar. 15, 2012, http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/03/15/meaningful-use- of-
health-it- stage-2-the-broader- meaning/.
See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Anticipating Stage Two: Assessing the Development of Meaningful Use
and EMR Deployment, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 103 (2012).
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As you might imagine, physicians and hospitals would like to have the incentive
payments for meeting minimal requirements. Not surprisingly, when the draft reg-
ulations were written, many physicians and hospitals pushed to have them scaled
back-and succeeded. The worry is that they will push back again."94
Sure enough, after the publication of the proposed Stage 2 rule, the cycle of
protest and negotiation repeated.95 HIMSS (the EMR vendors' trade associ-
ation), the American Hospital Association (AHA), Federation of American
Hospitals, the College of Healthcare Information Management, AMA and
others reacted to the proposed Stage 2 rule published in March 201296 with
calls for an extended timeline. AHA said in an April 30 letter to CMS that:
"Taken as a whole, the proposed requirements for meeting stage two raise the
bar too high and are not feasible for the majority of hospitals to achieve."9 7
Similarly, the American College of Cardiology commented: "When the addi-
tional workload is coupled with new and constantly changing requirements,
it is clear that the burden imposed by CMS through this proposal for Stage 2
goes above and beyond what providers and vendors are capable of addressing
before 2014."98
This time, however, HHS did not bend (at least in any major sense)
on objectives or measures.9 9 However, the department made another major
concession on the timeline.' The final rule delayed the onset of Stage 2
criteria by a year, to 2014 at the earliest."o' The reported reason was to give
vendors more time to develop the EMR technology to meet the demands of
Stage 2. Muted criticism continued, however, with the AMA board chair,
noting that "physicians are being held accountable for measures outside their
control" and that his organization remained "concerned that physicians have
to meet all of the required measures, and failing to meet just one measure
Id.
See Medicare and Medicaid Programs, Electronic Health Record Incentive Program-Stage 2, Proposed
Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 13,698 (Mar. 7, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 412, 413, 495), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-03-07/pdf/2012-4443.pdf.
Id.
97 John Reichard, Washington Health Policy Week in Review: Debate Heating Up over CMS Payments for
Health IT, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 2, 2012), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Newsletters/
Washington -Health - Policy -in - Review / 2012 /May/ May-7-2012 /Debate -Heating-Up -Over-CMS-
Payments-for-Health-IT.aspx.
Jeff Byers, Five Societies Blast CMS with Meaningful Use Opinions, HEALTH IMAGING (May 8, 2012),
http://www.healthimaging.com/index.php?option=com-articles&view=article&id=33934:five-socie
ties-blast-cms-with-meaningful-use-opinions.
See generally 77 Fed. Reg. 53,967.
a Id. at 53,974.
1or Id. at 53,974 (Table 3).
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would cause a physician to miss out on incentives and even face financial
penalties." 02
III. "MEANINGFUL ADOPTION"
Optimism (often in the face of provider pushback) has been a hallmark of
the EMR initiative. It is not unusual for federal government officials to make
optimistic remarks about progress and place an enthusiastic "spin" on any hard
numbers. Dr. Blumenthal told us in January 2011 that "[t]he tide is turning" 3
and a 2012 dialog between the present and the first HIT Coordinators (Dr.
Farzad Mostashari and Dr. David Brailer) featured non-specific phrases such
as "on the march" and "tremendous swelling of interest."'" Also prevalent is
"escalator" language. When Stage 2 was announced, Coordinator Mostashari
mixed phrases such as "stay the course" with "we can't wait five years to get
standards-based exchange."' Meanwhile, as MU has been operationalized,
federal regulators have access to a growing selection of metrics; "Registered,"
"Attested," "Received funds," and even the vague "Adopted."
Not surprisingly, studies suggest that physicians in larger practices, or
employed by hospitals, are more likely to adopt EMRs.'` The correlate also
is true; physicians owning their own practices are less likely to use EMRs.'07
There is greater difficulty in the implementation for smaller practices due to
certain "financial, technical, and time barriers"'
According to survey results published by KPMG, 48% of hospital and
health system business leaders were "confident" in their Stage I MU readiness,
while 39% were "somewhat confident."'" Clearly, pre-MU adopters aside,
providers have faced an array of challenges preparing to step on to the MU
escalator. The KPMG Poll found the greatest challenges facing hospitals
and health systems in meeting Stage 1 MU were comprehending the MU
Diana Manos, Negative Reaction to Stage 2: Docs Face Measures "Outside Their Control,"
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/negative- reaction-
mu2- docs-face- measures-outside- their-control.
103 David Blumenthal, EHR Adoption Set to Soar, The Office of the Nat'l Coordinator Health Info. Tech.
(Jan. 13, 2011), http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt?open=512&mode=2&objlD=3357.
David J. Brailer, David Brailerand Farzad Mostashari: Two National Health IT Czars Compare Notes,
31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 475, 476 (2012).
'05 NPRM for Stage 2 of Meaningful Use Available, HEALTH DATA MANAGEMENT (Apr. 11, 2012), http://
www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/EHR- meaningful- use-Stage- 2-details-44055- I.html.
'See, e.g., Catherine M. DesRoches et al., Electronic Health Records in Ambulatory Care-A National
Survey of Physicians, 359 NEw ENG. J. MED. 50 (2008).
Albert Boonstra & Manda Broekhuis, Barriers to the Acceptance of Electronic Medical Records by
Physicians from Systematic Review to Taxonomy and Interventions, BMC HEALTH SERv. RES. 12 (2010),
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-6963- 10-231 .pdf.
Id. at 14.
109 "Meaningful Use," supra note 76.
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requirements (25%), "training and change management" (20%), data capture
(18%), staffing (12%), and lacking certified technology (6%)."`
The adoption rates for EMRs under MU raise several sets of questions.
First, there are some basically quantitative questions regarding the level of
adoption and projections as to future adoption. Second, there are issues about
the stragglers and what lies ahead for them. Third, there is a far more difficult
question that goes to the qualitative level of adoption-just how many of
these freshly minted EMR systems are capable of performing the advanced
functions necessary to bring about major quality improvements in the delivery
of healthcare?
A. Quantitative Adoption
Clearly, a significant increase in EMR adoption in U.S. hospitals has
occurred over the last few years. The MU program is likely responsible for
much of this improvement. A 2012 AthenaHealth survey found that 62% of
physicians are now very familiar with EMRs."' Significant improvement first
appeared in California. California is traditionally an early mover in HIT and
also is home to the country's largest managed care organization and HIT-
friendly company, Kaiser Permanente." 2 According to a California Health-
care Foundation report, physician practices with an EMR in place sharply
increased from 3% in 2005 to 47% in 201 1." The same report noted gains
and improved penetration in larger practices for other types of HIT, such as
CPOE, e-prescribing, and decision support."' A 2012 survey using 2011 data
from California reported that 71% of physicians had "some form of EHR at
their main practice location.""' A June 2012 OIG report found that 57% of
physicians participating in Medicare used an EMR in 2011, although only
73% used certified technology." 6
Nationally, as shown by the 2012 AHA Annual Survey, the percentage
of U.S. hospitals adopting EHRs rose from 16% to 35% between 2009 and
201 1."' Recent figures for registrations and subsidy payments provided by
CMS also tell a positive story. By April 2012, 234,570 EPs (approximately
Id.
AthenaHealth 2012 Physician Sentiment Index, Q6 (June 12,2012), http://www.athenahealth.com/PSII
meaningful- use- incentives.php.
112 COFFMAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 14 (noting that 99% of Kaiser physicians had access to an EMR).
'3 The State of Health Information Technology in California, CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, May
2011, http://www.chcf.org/publications/2011/05/health-information-technology-california.
114 Id.
"W COFFMAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 9.
"6STUART WRIGHT, MEMORANDUM REPORT: USE OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEMS IN 2011 AMONG
MEDICARE PHYSICIANS PROVIDING EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES OEI-04-10-00184, at 7, http://
oig.hhs.gov/oeilreports/oei-04- 10-00184.pdf.
Dustin Charles et al., The Office of the Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., ONC Data Brief (Feb.
2012), http://www.healthit.gov/medialpdf/ONC-DataBrief-AHA.201 I.pdf.
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45% of the eligible pool of 521,600 and 3,569 out of 5,011 hospitals (approx-
imately 71%) had registered for the MU program."' By April 2012, payments
totaling $5 billion had been paid to approximately 94,000 providers."' These
figures show significant increases compared with those of December 201 1.120
Registration numbers seem generally compatible with earlier estimates from
the American Hospital Association that 85% of hospitals intend by 2015 to
take advantage of MU subsidies.121 In contrast, the numbers for individual
providers are not as positive; the AthenaHealth survey finding that fewer than
half of the physicians surveyed in 2012 had attempted to qualify for MU.1 2 2
While apparently positive (and surpassing HHS's goals 23 ), these num-
bers deserve a few caveats. First, it is likely that many of the early dis-
bursements achieved relatively little implementation. This is because prior
to MU, many of these early claimants of MU subsidy funds had already
installed EMRs.1 24 Second, the rate of registration likely has peaked. For ex-
ample, the March and April 2012 CMS data show significant declines in new
registrations.1 25 Obviously given the escalation model used by ONC, the fi-
nancial rewards decrease as MU continues. Providers who are late to the MU
party will see decreasing financial gains, casting doubts on their commitment
to the process (unless, of course, those losses are offset by other benefits
derived from the "value of waiting").1 26
Third, there is reason to believe that the MU actually being achieved
by providers is a somewhat watered down version of the already limited
Stage 1. A 2012 California HealthCare Foundation survey noted that 71%
of Californian physicians had access to an EMR but found that "only 30[%]
of physicians have EHRs with the functions necessary to achieve all 12 of




BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER TASK FORCE ON DELIVERY SYSTEM REFORM AND HEALTH IT, TRANSFORMING
HEALTHCARE: THE ROLE OF HEALTH IT. 1, 21 (Jan. 2012), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
Transforming%20Health%2OCare.pdf.
DAVID CHARLES ET AL., ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEMS AND INTENT To ArrEST TO MEANINGFUL
NON-FEDERAL ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008-2011, at 2 (Feb. 2012), available at
http://www.healthit.gov/medialpdf/ONC.Data-BriefAHA-201 I.pdf.
122AthenaHealth, supra note 111, at Q21-22.
U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., News Release, More Than 100,000 Health Care Providers Paid
for Using Electronic Health Records (June 19, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2012pres/06/20120619a.html.
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Purpose, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/10/12/6934/
health- information-technology- incentives- may-not- always- serve- intended- purpose.
125 Joseph Conn, EHR Incentive Payments Top $5 Billion, MODERN HEALTHCARE (June 4, 2012), http://
www.modemhealthcare.com/article/20120604/NEWS/306049987#ixzzlyGmZNNKi?trk=tynt.
Christensen & Remler, supra note 30, at 1022-25.
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the meaningful use objectives measured."1 27 A possible implication is that
in the state with the highest penetration of HIT, 64% of physicians either
have no EMR or use an EMR that fails to meet Stage 1 MU requirements.
A similar disconnect can be found in the IVANS 2012 Provider Survey that
found 42% of providers have implemented EMRs, but that only 37% have
achieved meaningful use of EMR.12 8 Evidence suggests that installed legacy
systems and equipment combinations make the higher end MU objectives
very difficult to achieve. Such technical deficiencies may also help explain
provider difficulties in exchanging information and the increased deferrals or
requested exemptions from electronic patient copy at discharge, summary of
care at transition, and public health objectives.1 29 As hospitals enter a period
of budget tightening, doubts also must arise as to whether they will have funds
sufficient to complete some EMR adoptions.'30
An April 2012 report from the General Accounting Office (GAO) found:
"Among participants in the first year of the Medicare EHR program, the
majority of providers chose to exempt themselves from reporting on at least
one meaningful use measure and many providers reported at least one clinical
quality measure based on few-less than seven-patients." 3 ' Since the GAO
also recommended that CMS tighten up its auditing processes, the possibility
that there is already a considerable vector between what CMS should be
paying for and what providers are actually capable of delivering exists. Put
slightly differently, using the words of an insider: "Who would complain
that a doctor attested inappropriately? No one, so no one will be audited." 32
Subsequent to the GAO report CMS announced that it would begin audits,
though most would only be "desk" audits.'33
B. The EMR Stragglers
Based on the numbers so far, a pessimistic scenario would be stabi-
lization of implementation at approximately 50% of physicians and 75%
127 COFFMAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 10.
128 IVANS, 2012 HEALTHCARE PROVIDER SURVEY 4, 14 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.ivans.com/
assets/208.pdf.
129See Genevieve Douglas, Providers Share Experiences Achieving Meaningful Use, but Chal-
lenges Remain, BLOOMBERG BNA, Oct. 12, 2011, available at http://www.bna.com/providers-share-
experiences-nl2884903856.
130See generally David Houle & Jonathon Fleece, Why One-Third of Hospitals Will Close by 2020, POLICY
(Mar. 14 2012), available at http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2012/03/onethird-hospitals-close-2020.
html.131 GAO, First Year of CMS's Incentive Programs Shows Opportunities to Improve Processes to Verify
Providers Met Requirements, GAO-12-481, Apr. 30, 2012, http://gao.gov/assets/600/590538.pdf.
m See Ken Terry, AthenaHealth CEO Says Meaningful Use Needs Performance Data, INFORMATION-
WEEK (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.informationweek.com/news/healthcare/policy/231900421 (quoting
Jonathan Bush, CEO of AthenaHealth).
133 Stage 2 Meaningful Use Final Rule Expected by Beginning ofSeptember CMS Official Says, BLOOMBERG
BNA, Aug. 15, 2012, http://www.bna.com/stage-meaningful-final-n12884911198/.
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of hospitals. However, as later Stages of MU (for example, Stage 2's data
exchange requirements) ramp up and assuming that the auditing process is
tightened, some of those providers may fall victim to the inadequacies of their
chosen EMRs and will be forced off the escalator.
The IVANS 2012 Provider Survey found that 39% of providers have no
plans to implement Stage 1.13 At first sight, this seems consistent with the
pessimistic scenario outlined. However, the IVANS survey included ineligible
MU providers. Critically, many MU orphan hospitals (long-term acute care,
rehabilitation, and psychiatric hospitals) are adopting EMRs at a far slower
rate (penetration is a lamentable 2-6%) than those receiving subsidies.'3 5
Nevertheless, this parallel issue should cause concern with regard to quality of
care, both within MU providers and those in ineligible environments because
of the near impossibility of sharing patient information. 13 6
Whether because of ineligibility, failure to register, or fear of potential
failure at attestation, it is arguable that a substantial number of providers
will continue to lack EMRs. Disproportionately, this will be the case with
poorer, rural, or smaller institutions; the very ones that were identified by Dr.
Blumenthal as so needing EMRs, those "smaller clinics and practices where
most Americans receive their health care."'3 7 There is a strong connection
between high quality hospitals and EMR implementation"' and little reason
to doubt the negative correlate. Recent evidence suggests the "[w]idening
of ... gaps in adoption of EHR systems based on hospital size, teaching
status, location, and region of the country" while "[t]he gap based on size, for
instance, increased from 15[%] to 22[%], and nonteaching and rural hospitals
likewise fell further behind."'3 9 These impressions have been confirmed by a
GAO report noting that of the 2011 hospital recipients of MU funds 67% were
in urban areas and 46% were very large (top third by number of beds).1 40
The idea that HIT implementation patterns may increase the vector
between low and high quality care is further supported by data concerning
EMR implementation by physicians. Decker and colleagues comment that
IVANS, supra note 128, at 3.
See generally NAT'L COUNCIL CMTY. BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE, HIT ADOPTION AND READINESS FOR MEAN-
INGFUL USE IN COMMUNITY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH (June 2012), available at http://www.thenationalcouncil.
org/galleries/business-practice%20files/HIT%2OSurvey%2OFull%20 Report.pdf.
Larry Wolf et al., Hospitals Ineligible for Federal Meaningful-Use Incentives Have Dismally Low Rates
of Adoption of Electronic Health Records, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 505, 505-13 (2012).
Blumenthal & Tavenner, supra note 23, at 501.
138 See, e.g., Elnahal et al., Electronic Health Record Functions Differ Between Best and Worst Hospitals,
17(4) AM. J. MANAGED CARE 121, 121-47 (2011).
139 Catherine M. DesRoches et al., Small, Nonteaching, and Rural Hospitals Continue to Be Slow in
Adopting Electronic Health Record Systems, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1092, 1097 (2012).
U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Electronic Health Records: Number and Characteristics offProviders




between 2002 and 2011, "adoption continued to lag for non-primary care
specialists, physicians age fifty-five and older, and physicians in small (1-2
providers) and physician-owned practices." 4 ' In contrast, "[b]y 2011 more
than 99[%] of physicians in health maintenance organizations and about 73[%]
of those in academic health centers and other hospitals used an EHR system."1 4 2
The authors conclude that "[t]hese patterns continue to show the ability of
large practices and those owned by health maintenance organizations and
other health care organizations to adopt EHR systems" but that "physicians
in these practices make up only a small portion of all practicing office-based
physicians."'43
C. Qualitative Adoption
The possibility that many MU registrants are working with sub-MU
technologies is discussed above. This installed base (or some portion of it)
may fail properly audited attestation and struggle to comply with future MU
stages.'" A similar question is here posed about the difficulty of those EMRs
complying with the data sharing Objectives in the Stage 2 Objectives and
questions whether the MU "escalator" will be able to lead providers much
further up the slope to sophisticated HIT implementation.
In this article, the term electronic medical record (EMR) has been used al-
most exclusively, in contrast to electronic health record (EHR). The HITECH
definition is neutral, defining an EHR as "an electronic record of health-related
information on an individual that is created, gathered, managed, and consulted
by authorized health care clinicians and staff." 45 In fact, an EMR is a more
limited version of the technology, "a digital version of the paper charts in the
clinician's office ... [containing] the medical and treatment history of the pa-
tients in one practice."'4 6 In contrast, "EHRs are designed to reach out beyond
the health organization that originally collects and compiles the information.
They are built to share information with other health care providers, such as
141 Sandra L. Decker et al., Physicians in Nonprimary Care and Small Practices and Those Age 55 and
Older Lag in Adopting Electronic Health Record Systems, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1108, 1108 (2012); see
COFFMAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 14 (reporting similar findings among California physicians).
42 Decker et al., supra note 114, at 1111.
14 Id.
David Raths, MU Work Group to Make Initial Stage 3 Recommendations in August, HEALTH-
CARE INFORMATICS, July 5, 2012, http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/article/mu-work-group-
make-initial-stage- 3 -recommendations-august?WA.-MAILING LEVEL CODE=& spMailinglD =
39427252&spUserlD=MzYzODMIODI2MAS2&spJoblD=149569313&spReportld=MTQ5NTY5
MzEzSO.
145 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 42 U.S.C. § 17921(5) (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010).
46 Peter Garrett & Joshua Seidman, EMR vs. EHR-What Is the Difference?, HEALTHIT Buzz, Jan. 4, 2011,
http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/electronic-health-and-medical-records/emr-vs-ehr-difference/.
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laboratories and specialists, so they contain information from all the clinicians
involved in the patient's care."14 7
Such information exchange or sharing is fundamental to MU's stated
goals of improving quality, safety, efficiency, patient engagement, promoting
public health, and improving care coordination. However, it appears there
are far more EMRs than EHRs in use. The delta is currently expressed as
the difference between basic (EMRs) and comprehensive (or fully functional)
systems (EHRs).14 8 EHRs should be able to exchange information with other
EHRs (for example, other providers' systems), share data with patients and
external stakeholders such as public health authorities, and share information
across an institution's HIT ecosystem (such as with e-prescribing, CPOE, or
clinical decision support (CDS)'49 modules).'
The implementation vector between basic and comprehensive systems
is not new.'5 However, it is surprising that the gap remains as high. For exam-
ple, a recent ONC/AHA survey reported that although almost 35% of acute
care hospitals had adopted EMRs by 2011, only 8.8% had comprehensive
systems.1 52 Clearly this issue is related to the discussion above; that the low
level of technology actually present in the installed bases of EMRs may be
hampering compliance with the relatively low threshold of Stage 1.'3 It also
helps explain the strong pushback from providers regarding the data sharing
and exchange requirements in the proposed Stage 2 standards.1 54
Although EMRs are a better storage model than paper records, HIT mod-
ules in isolation do little improve the safety, quality, or efficiency of healthcare.
1 Id.; see also Dave Garets & Mike Davis, Electronic Medical Records vs. Electronic Health Records:
Yes, There Is a Difference, HIMSS ANALYTICS (2006), http://www.himssanalytics.org/docs/WPEMR
EHR.pdf (discussing early concepts).148
See Prashila Dullabh et al., White Paper: Measurement of the Utilization of an Installed EHR, U.S.
DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., (2009) (discussing various approaches to assessing the functionality
of records technologies), http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2009/ehrutil/index.shtml.
What Is Clinical Decision Support?, HIMSS, http://www.himss.orglasp/topics-clinicaldecision.asp
("Clinical Decision Support is a process for enhancing health-related decisions and actions with
pertinent, organized clinical knowledge and patient information to improve health and healthcare
delivery").
150
See generally Sharon Silow-Carroll et al., Using Electronic Health Records to Improve Quality
and Efficiency: The Experiences of Leading Hospitals, 17 COMMONWEALTH FUND 1 (July 2, 2012),
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Issue%2OBrief/2012/Jul/
1608-SilowCarroll-using-EHRsimprove-quality.pdf (detailing comprehensive EMR implementation
in nine hospitals).
151
See Chun-Ju Hsiao et al., Preliminary Estimates of Electronic Medical Record Use by Office-Based
Physicians: United States, 2008, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATrsTIcs (2008), http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/hestat/physicians08/physiciansO8.pdf.
152
Charles et al., supra note 117.
154 See supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.'54





This is also true both for CPOE modules.5 and e-prescribing systems'5 6 when
unaccompanied by clinical decision support. The limitations of basic EMRs
may also explain recent critical studies of records implementations that have
failed to deliver expected increases in care quality. Crosson and colleagues
reported a diabetes study showing "that having an EHR as opposed to a paper-
based record-keeping system does not guarantee better care and suggest that
many practices that have adopted EHRs have not made the necessary changes
to both work processes and ways of thinking about care that would lead to
improvements in chronic illness management."' More controversially, Ro-
mano and colleagues cast serious doubts on the benefits of the new technology
by finding: "No association between EHR use and care quality for nineteen
indicators and a positive relationship for only one indicator."' The criticism
prompted a literature review from ONC staff that suggested a more positive
correlation of HIT to improved patient safety.' 59 Many modem studies seem
at most ambivalent regarding quality improvements. For example, Appari and
colleagues examined process quality among 2011 meaningful use-compliant
hospitals. EMR adoption among low-technology hospitals produced a positive
quality spike, a very small but measurable improvement in mid-level hospi-
tals, and a significant decline in quality among hospitals seeking to move to
post-2011 MU technology levels.' 60
A recent article in Health Affairs opened up a new avenue of EMR crit-
icism. In the article, McCormick argued that HIT-mediated access to prior
imaging or blood test results or other physical examinations would increase
the ordering of new tests.' 6 ' The belief brought forward a sharp response
from ONC, a defensive re-framing from the Coordinator that "[t]he ultimate
155 See Karen C. Nanji et al., Errors Associated with Outpatient Computerized Prescribing Systems, 18 J.
AM. MED. INFORMATICS Ass'N 767 (2011).
See Johanna I. Westbrook et al., Effects of Two Commercial Electronic Prescribing Systems on Pre-
scribing Error Rates in Hospital In-Patients: A before and after Study, 9 PLoS MEDICINE 1 (Jan. 31,
2012), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2Fl0.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.
1001164.
157 See Jesse C. Crosson et al., Typical Electronic Health Record Use in Primary Care Practices and the
Quality of Diabetes Care, 10 ANNALS FAM. MED. 221 (May/June 2012); Daria O'Reilly et al., Cost-
Effectiveness of a Shared Computerized Decision Support System for Diabetes Linked to Electronic
Medical Records, 19 J. AM. MED. INFORMATics Ass'N 341 (2012) (showing only marginal improvement
in trial involving treatment of diabetes type 2).
158 Max J. Romano & Randall S. Stafford, Electronic Health Records and Clinical Decision Support
Systems: Impact on National Ambulatory Care Quality, 171 ARCHIVES INT. MED. 897, 901 (2011).
159 Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., The Benefits of Health Information Technology: A Review of the
Recent Literature Shows Predominantly Positive Results, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 464, 464 (2011).
1Ajit Appari et al., Meaningful Use of Electronic Health Record Systems and Process Quality of Care:
Evidence from a Panel Data Analysis of US. Acute-Care Hospitals, HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH, July 20,
2012, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.lib.siu.edu/doi/l 0.111 1/j. 1475-6773.2012.01448.x/pdf.
Danny McCormick, Giving Office-Based Physicians Electronic Access to Patients' Prior Imaging and
Lab Results Did Not Deter Ordering of Tests, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 488, 493 (2012).
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impact of EHRs on reducing cost will be through improvements in the co-
ordination and quality of care, and the prevention of unnecessary and costly
complications and hospitalizations."1 6 2
Possibly because of Dr. Brailer's background in information exchanges,
the Bush Administration made a priority of promoting of interoperability be-
tween records systems.' The MU project, particularly Stage 1, has focused
more on clinical applications such as robust recording of health information.
ONC has relied on its other, more modest funding mechanisms to encour-
age health information exchange.'" Not surprisingly, evaluations of data ex-
change have showed only limited progress."' In 2010, MU's approach to data
exchange was strongly criticized by the President's Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology (PCAST).'6 6 PCAST characterized ONC's data shar-
ing plans as "very modest" and instead urged a "simultaneous focus on the
capability for universal data exchange, able to unleash the power of the com-
petitive market, to produce increasingly better and less expensive systems,
and to create the 'network effect' that spurs further adoption." 6 7 PCAST in-
sisted the use of a "'universal exchange language' that enables health IT data
to be shared across institutions; and also to create the infrastructure that al-
lows physicians and patients to assemble a patient's data across institutional
boundaries. .. ."168
In 2011, ONC responded with a moderate proposal for metadata stan-
dards that could facilitate the exchange of summary patient records.' The
more recent Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) report, Transforming Health
Care: The Role of Health IT, listed the "Lack of Health Information Ex-
change" as one of the primary barriers to high performance healthcare. Specif-
ically, BPC identified limited Stage I MU requirements, lack of a robust
162
Dr. FarzadMostashari, Recent Study: Get the Facts, HEALTHITBUZz (Mar. 6,2012), http://www.healthit.
gov/buzz-blog/meaningful-use/study-facts/; see also Janet Marchibroda, Does Health IT Reduce Costs
or Not?, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. BLOG (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/2012/03/
does-health-it-reduce-costs-or-not.
163 See generally Timothy Mullaney, This Man Wants to Heal Healthcare, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Oct.
30, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05-44/b3957113.htm.
See, e.g., Nationwide Health Information Network, HEALTH IT, http://healthit.hhs.gov/portalIserver.pt/
community/healthit-hhs-govnhin-exchange/ 1407.
165
Robert H. Miller, Satisfying Patient-Consumer Principles for Health Information Exchange: Evidence
from California Case Studies, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 537 (2012).
See PRESIDENT'S COUNSEL ADVISORS Sc. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL
OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE HEALTHCARE FOR AMERICANS: THE PATH FORWARD (2010).
Id. at 3.
168Id. at 4.
19Metadata Standards to Support Nationwide Electronic Health Information Exchange, 76 Fed. Reg.
48,769, 48,776 (Aug. 9, 2011).
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infrastructure to support exchange (with little enthusiasm for ONC's "Di-
rect Project" model' notwithstanding its recent growth in adoption'.), and,
echoing PCAST, a lack of sufficiently sophisticated data standards.'7 2
IV. QUALITY, SATISFACTION, AND SAFETY
As with many products and services (particularly complex ones), HIT
products will exhibit negative externalities. In the case of EMRs, most at-
tention has been directed at their privacy and security risks.' In contrast,
one of the themes explored herein has been that the installed base of EMRs
is underperforming. Either EMRs are not being used to their fullest extent
to perform MU tasks or the systems deployed are quite limited in their ca-
pabilities. Either way, there is suspicion that EMR flaws are responsible for
failure to meet current MU stages and are unlikely to be capable of the com-
prehensive or interoperable levels of use expected in the future by the MU
architects. Lack of specifications and poor usability illustrate only part of the
underperformance narrative. Poor design or manufacture also brings into play
safety regimes such as FDA device regulation, product liability, and medical
malpractice.
A. Quality and Satisfaction
A 2011 survey of Californian physicians suggested that physicians
are less than satisfied with their EMR experiences.'74 Although the 2012
AthenaHealth survey found that 71% of physicians were generally positive
about EMRs, it reported that a large percentage of physicians considered the
technology expensive to purchase, install and maintain. 7 1
Historically, EMRs have been designed to answer the needs of hospitals
(of which pre-MU was the only sizeable market) and are less sensitive to
patient and provider heterogeneity.1 76 Today, a declining number of physicians
70 See generally DIRECT PROJEcr, OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION TECH-
NOLOGY (Aug. 2, 2012), http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/community/healthit-hhs-gov-direct-
project/3338.
"7 Brett Andriesen, Bright Spots of the Direct Project Adoption, HEALTHITBuzz (June 18, 2012), http://
www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/state-hie/the-direct-project-adoption/.
172 See generally Transfonning Health Care: The Role of IT BIPARTISIAN POLICY CENTER, Jan. 27, 2012,
http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/news/multimedia/2012/02/transforming-health-care-role-health-it.
Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health
Records, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 681, 683.
174COFFMAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 13 (reporting that a survey of California physicians found only 35%
"very satisfied" with their EMRs and 38% "somewhat satisfied").
7sAthenaHealth, supra note 111, at Ql11, Q17.
"7 See, e.g., Katherine Rourke, Why Hospitals Can't Talk EMRs with Doctors, HOsPITAL EMR & EHR, Sept.
1, 2011, http://www.hospitalemrandehr.com/2011/09/01/why-hospitals-cant-talk-emrs-with-doctors/.
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believe that EMRs were designed with them in mind."' Generally, physicians
are now taking less of an active role in purchasing EMRs for their practices."'
ONC is attempting to increase market transparency through improved
versions of its online Certified Health IT Product List (CHPL).'7 9 There are
large numbers of EMR vendors, with over 200 listed as having supplied a
product that was meaningfully used.' A recent OIG report noted that just nine
vendors supplied 60% of Medicare physicians.'' Overall, the EMR market
does not seem to work very well. This is in part because the various EMR
products are proprietary. Vendors, therefore, are able to practice technological
"lock-in," relying on the proprietary nature of EMRs and the data formats they
use to make it very difficult for providers to move to other products,1 8 2 even
when a superior competing product emerges. Moving between products during
meaningful use is particularly difficult."' The proprietary nature of EMRs has
other implications. This is a time of considerable merger activity among
health care providers. Yet combining incompatible HIT systems during MU
is a considerable challenge." Consolidation of HIT vendors can also cause
problems. This was illustrated by the testimony of a dermatologist before
a House panel; she reported a difficult transition to an EMR causing sharp
decline in patient volume, only to be followed by the acquisition of her EMR
vendor by a company that did not support her network.'
Consistent with one of the narrative themes of this article-that EMRs
and related HIT modules are not very good and may be impeding MU-are
recent criticisms of EMR usability. According to the AMA, "[t]here is a
direct correlation between EHR adoption and the usability of an EHR.""' A
AthenaHealth, supra note 111, at Q15.
Id. at Q9.
Mary Mosquera, ONC Improves Usability of Online Certified EHRs List, GOVERNMENT HEALTHIT (June
25, 2012), http://www.govhealthit.com/news/onc-improves-usability-online-certified-ehrs-listtopic=
08.
SO Joseph Conn, Few EHR Vendors Dominate Payments, MODERN HEALTHCARE.COM (Jan. 13, 2012), http://
www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20120113/NEWS/301139989.
181 WRIGHT, supra note 116, at 8.182 Sarita Harbour, What Is a Vendor Lock-In?, HousrON CHRON., http://smallbusiness.chron.com/vendor-
lockin-33663.html.183See, e.g., John Lynn, Meaningful Use Provides Hospital EHR Vendor Lock In, HOSPITAL EMR
& EHR (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.hospitalemrandehr.com/2012/04/1 0/meaningful-use- provides-
hospital-ehr- vendor-lock-in/.
Joel Schectman, For Hospital CIOs, Mergers Complicate Move to Electronic Records, CIO
J., June 13, 2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2012/06/1 3/for-hospital-cios-mergers-complicate-move-
to-electronic-records/.
1ss Not What the Doctor Ordered: Barriers to Health ITfor Small Medical Practices: Hearing before the
H. Subcomm. on Health Care and Technology, I12th Cong. 18-20 (2011) (statement of Sasha Kramer,
M.D.), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRGI12hhrg68062/html/CHRG11 2hhrg68062.htm.
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large number of usability issues seem associated with interface design and
usability, including data sorting costs. In 2011, during testimony before the
ONC Certification/Adoption Workgroup, an Iowa internist detailed some of
the current frustrations with EMR interfaces: "Improvements in usability are
urgently needed to address [a] widespread experience of overwhelm" and
noted the cognitive workload for physicians trying to mentally reorganize
data that is poorly organized in EMRs.
It cannot be assumed that simply because a piece of information is somewhere within
the EHR that it will be easily available to the clinicians caring for the patient. It may
be buried in an inaccessible location or overlooked because of poor information
display.' 87
By way of illustration, Gawande has related how his EMR software did not
include (some admittedly rare) diseases forcing him to use "other" on the
pull-down menu.'s
It is likely that some usability problems are functions of transition-
ing staff from paper to electronic systems and will improve or disappear over
time.' 89 However, empirical studies increasingly support the position that there
are persistent usability issues in the current generation of HIT. In a RAND
study, Ridgely and Greenberg critically examine Drug-Drug Interaction (DDI)
alerts initiated by CDS systems. Specifically, they explore two related phe-
nomena; the first being the tendency of CDS to generate a very large number
of DDI alerts that leads to "alert fatigue" suffered by physicians."' Russ
and colleagues have found similar dysfunction relating to "inadequate alert
interface design" in CPOEs.m'
The confrontation of usability issues is still quite immature and
a major challenge. One National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) scientist described usability as "often ... an afterthought in the
187 Written testimony of Christine A. Sinsky before Certification/Adoption Workgroup Usability Panel
2 (Apr. 21, 2011), http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt?open=space&name=Dir&id=cached&
psname=Dir&psid= I &in.hiuserid= 10741 &cached= true&control=DirRepost&rangeFrom=2 1&
rangeTo=25&subfolderID= 18327&DirMode= 1.
m ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: How To GET THINGS RIGHT 22 (2009).
189See, e.g., Kirk Johannesen, Columbus Hospital Blames Electronic Records for Rising ER Waits,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 8, 2012, http://www.indystar.com/article/20120808/NEWS/120808018/
Columbus-hospital-blames-electronic- records- rising-ER-waits (reporting doubling of patients'
lengths of stay in a hospital emergency department during transition to EMR).mM. Susan Ridgely & Michael D. Greenberg, Too Many Alerts, Too Much Liability: Sorting through
the Malpractice Implications of Drug-Drug Interaction Clinical Decision Support, 5 ST. Louis U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 257, 259 (2011-2012).
1 Alissa L. Russ et al., Prescribers' Interactions with Medication Alerts at the Point of Prescribing: A
Multi-Method, in Situ Investigation of the Human-Computer Interaction, 81 INT'L J. MED. INFORMATICS
232, 240 (2012).
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industry."' 9 2 In 2012, NIST requested EMRs from vendors to begin a yearlong
study on usability to "(1) Develop a set of guidelines/standards for the usability
of HITIEHRs, and (2) develop a framework for assessing EHR usability." 9 3
Improving how physicians interact with HIT and integrate technology into
their workflows will be fundamental to the success of programs like MU.
Eric Topol has described the use of an EMR during a patient encounter as
follows: "Rather than looking the patient in the eye, the physician is looking
at a screen and typing in the data. Most doctors are uncomfortable typing and
are slow and prone to making errors."9 4 The implications may be profound
for the physician-patient relationship. As Topol further opines:
So in the mind of the physician, a lot of insight is missing as result of less direct
communication with patient and less ability to freely express one's thoughts. Sym-
metrically, the patient feels less direct contact and is often disturbed by the doctor's
pecking on the keyboard and looking at the screen. The sense of not being heard or
understood is often prompted by this distracted, electronically fettered encounter.' 95
The large number of providers that now employ medical scribes to record
the medical encounter in the EMR provides strong evidence of the seriousness
of this issue.'9 6 As described by one medical administrator: "The solution was
to take the doctors off the computer, put them at the bedside, and let the
scribe do the transcription. It's been a huge success. The physicians love it."19 7
The practice is becoming widespread enough that the Joint Commission has
issued guidelines as to the use of scribes.'9 8 In itself, however, this practice
provides a metaphor for the failings of the current generation of EMRs (at
least in their user interface) and casts doubt on some of the claims made for
the cost-savings they bring.
192 Kenny Goldberg, iHealthBeat Special Report: Health Care Industry Struggle with Usability of
Electronic Health Record Systems, IHEALTHBEAT, June 13, 2012, http://origin.eastbaymedia.com/-
advisoryboard/podcast-media/iHBSpecialReportTranscript061312.pdf.
Evaluating the Usability of Electronic Health Record (EHR) Systems, 77 Fed. Reg. 8,217 (Feb.
14,2012), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-02-14/html/2012-3415.htm; see also Lowry et al.,
Technical Evaluation, Testing and Validation of the Usability of Electronic Health Records, NAT'L INST.
OF SCI. AND TECH. INTERAGENCY REP. 7804 (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get-pdf.cfm?
pub-id=909701.
ERIC TOPOL, THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF MEDICINE: HOW THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION WILL CREATE BETTER
HEALTH CARE 150 (2012).
95 Id.
196 Harris Meyer, Scribes Are Doctors' Tech Support, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2010, http://articles.latimes.
com/2010/sep/06/healthla-he-medical-scribes-20100906.
mId. (quoting Dr. Robert Steele, Loma Linda University Medical Center).
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There is cogent evidence that increased EMR use will reduce provider
errors and decrease malpractice claims.'9 9 However, and not without irony,
"[w]hile hospital electronic medical records (EMR) are intended to reduce
medical errors, several aspects of the EMR may actually increase the incidence
of certain types of errors or produce new safety risks that result in harm."20
Medical errors caused by the increased use of technological innovations are
an issue of growing importance.2 0 '
In 2010, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) disclosed that even
without any formal reporting system, it had recorded 260 "HIT-related mal-
functions" in the preceding two years.2 0 2 The loM broadly agrees, stating in
its November 2011 report, Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Sys-
tems for Better Care, that "[d]esigned and applied inappropriately, health IT
can add an additional layer of complexity to the already complex delivery of
health care, which can lead to unintended adverse consequences, for example
dosing errors, failure to detect fatal illnesses, and delayed treatment due to
poor human-computer interactions or loss of data." 20 3 Certainly a significant
number of physicians perceive an increase in errors associated with EMR
adoption.204
Although understanding the error profiles of EMRs is immature, the
FDA already has created a four-part taxonomy: errors of commission, errors
of omission or transmission, errors in data analysis, and technological in-
compatibility between multi-vendor applications and systems.20 5 The origins
of these errors may also be subjected to broad classification. According to
Harrington and colleagues: "Threats to patient safety can be introduced dur-
ing any phase of the EMR lifecycle, such as planning, design, development,
testing, implementation, operations, and maintenance. Within each of these
processes, technology, people, and the work environment can individually or
collectively generate errors." 206
1 Mariah A. Quinn et al., The Relationship between Electronic Health Records and Malpractice Claims,
172 ARCHIVES INT. MED. 1187, 1188 (2012).
200 Harrington et al., Safety Issues Related to the Electronic Medical Record (EMR): Synthesis of the
Literature from the Last Decade, 2000-2009, 56 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 31, 32 (2011).
201 See, e.g., Joel Schectman, Philips Recalls Flawed Patient Data System, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2012,
http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2012/07/20/philips-recalls-flawed-patient-data-system/.
202 HIT Pot'Y CoMM. ADOr'iON/CERnFICATION WORKGROuP, TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY SHUREN, DIRECTOR
OF FDA's CENTER FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH 2 (Feb. 25, 2010), available at http:/Ihealthit.
hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS-0-1 1673.910717_0-0 18/3ShurenTestimony022510.pdf.
INST. MED., HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY: BUILDING SAFER SYSTEMS FOR BETTER CARE
2 (2012), available at http://iom.edulReports/2011/Health-IT-and-Patient-Safety- Building-Safer-
Systems- for- Better-Care.aspx.
204 DesRoches et al., supra note 106, at 57.
205 HIT POL'Y COMM., supra note 202, at 2.
206 Harrington et al., supra note 200, at 31-43.
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C. Device Regulation
As the profile of safety issues involving EMRs and related HIT technolo-
gies has increased, so has the likelihood of federal safety regulation.20 7 Techni-
cally, EMRs should be able to perform their own post-marketing surveillance
and that of connected HIT devices. However, as currently regulated, the Certi-
fication standard does not address the issue of EMR errors and their potential
adverse effect on patient safety. In 2008, Hoffman and Podgurski canvassed
the options for EMR regulation, 20 8 concluding that a new agency would be
preferable to the FDA and that "an adequately funded agency focused exclu-
sively on HIT, with a concentration of technical talent and expertise, could be
an effective vehicle for regulating EHR systems."2" As MU came online, the
issue of appropriate regulation became politically charged. The FDA char-
acterized its regulatory inaction as an exercise of discretion as it evaluates
the field. 210 However, the HIT industry and ONC took the position that safety
regulation would slow down innovation and implementation by inhibiting
innovation and increasing costs. 2 11
In 2010, the loM was asked to recommend a resolution of the issue.
In a November 2011 report in Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer
Systems for Better Care, the loM apparently sided with ONC. It recommended
that a new entity, the Health IT Safety Council, should be established within
HHS to collect and provide information and set safety standards.2 1 2 Reacting
to the report, ONC Coordinator Mostashari commented: "HHS agrees with
IOM that more can and should be done to capture safety issues unique to
EHRs when and if they arise. ONC will lead an HHS planning initiative to
develop a comprehensive EHR safety action and surveillance plan well within
the 12-month period recommended by IOM." 213 That timeline may be coming
under critical scrutiny. In June 2012, Congresswoman Ellmers, the chair of the
207 See generally Fred Schulte & Emma Schwartz, Electronic Medical Record Shift: Signs
of Harm Emerge as Doctors Move from Paper, HUFFINGTON POST, May 25, 2011, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/20/electronic-medical-record-n.545441 .html.
208 Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Finding a Cure: The Case for Regulation and Oversight of
Electronic Health Record Systems, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 126-40 (2008).
20Id. at 140.
21o HIT POt'Y COMM., supra note 202, at 3.
211 Fred Schulte & Emma Schwartz, FDA Considers Regulating Safety ofElectronic Health Systems, HuFF-
INGTON PosT, May 25, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/23/fda-considers-regulating-n-
474137.html; Neil Versel, FDA, ONC Clash over EMR Safety Issues, FIERCE EMR (Aug. 5, 2010),
http://www.fierceemr.com/story/fda-onc-clash-over-emr-safety-issues/2010-08-05; Milt Freudenheim,
Panel Set to Study Safety of Electronic Patient Data, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/12/14/business/14records.html? r=0; Mary Mosquera, HHS Panel Endorses Pa-
tient Safety Database, Government HealthlT (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.govhealthit.com/news/
hhs-panel-endorses- patient-safety-database.
212 INST. MED., supra note 203, at 3.




House Small Business Subcommittee on Healthcare and Technology, wrote to
Secretary Sibelius requesting, inter alia, all available data on HIT-related risks
adverse results and the specifics of HHS's plan to minimize safety risks.2 14
Overall it is difficult to see FDA withdrawing completely from the
field. Dissenting from the loM HIT safety report, Dr. Richard Cook argued
that leaving "quality, accuracy, precision, reliability, and safety" in the hands
of the vendors "is unacceptable for health IT that must provide high-level
performance in a hazardous environment." Dr. Cook concluded that "health
IT is a medical device.... It should be regulated as a medical device now and
should have been regulated as a medical device in the past."2 15
The regulatory agency's responses to calls for action have been re-
strained. In 2010, Dr. Jeffrey Shuren, director of the FDA's Center for Devices
and Radiological Health, testified that "FDA has largely refrained from en-
forcing our regulatory requirements with respect to HIT devices."21 6 A few
months later, Dr. Shuren admitted that "[a]s of right now we're not regulating
EHRs, and it may turn out that we won't," while acknowledging that "EHRs
touch all kinds of medical devices that we have been regulating for a long
time, and they impact the functioning of those technologies."2 1 7
There are several regulatory models that the FDA could follow. EMRs
could be subject to premarket regulation, such as Premarket Notification (Class
1 or 2 devices)2 16 or Premarket Approval (Class 3 devices), or less taxing post-
market controls, such as voluntary or mandatory surveillance.2 1 9 However, it
is important to remember the loM's conclusion that while "Instances of health
IT-associated harm have been reported," "little published evidence could be
found quantifying the magnitude of the risk."22 0 It is at least likely that FDA is
biding its time, documenting more adverse results, while building a strategy
for regulating both existing devices and future challenging technologies, such
as mobile medical applications that run on smartphones. The agency's 2011
Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical Applications committed to the regulation
of medical mobile applications "used as an accessory to a regulated medical
214 Letter from Renee L. Ellmers, Chairwoman, U.S. H.R. Comm. Small Bus., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec'y,
U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs. (June 2, 2012), available at http://smbiz.house.gov/UploadedFiles/
SebeliusliealthITJOM.reportfollowup-6_12_12.pdf.
INST. MED., supra note 203, at 197.
216 HIT PoL'Y COMM., supra 202, at 2.
217David Raths, Report from PharmEHR Summit: Will FDA Regulate EHRs?, HEALTH-
CARE INFORMATICS, Apr. 8, 2011, available at http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/article/
report-pharmehr- summit-will-fda-regulate-ehrs (quoting Dr. Shuren).218 Note that the agency recently reclassified so-called Medical Device Data Systems (basically conduit,
storage, or display components) to Class 1. Medical Devices, Medical Device Data Systems, 76 Fed.
Reg. 8,637, 8638 (Feb. 15, 2011).219
21 U.S.C. § 360c (2012); see generally U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., OVERVIEW OF DEVICE REGULATION
(Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
Overview/default.htm.
220
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device" or one that "transforms a mobile platform into a regulated medical
device."2 2 ' The same guidance specifically excluded "Mobile apps that perform
the functionality of an electronic health record system or personal health
record system,"2 22 suggesting the agency will apply a different regulatory
model to EMRs.
The FDA knows that EMR safety regulation is both technically difficult
and a "political hot potato."2 2 3 It is also inevitable. As a result, it is probable
that the agency will allow the MU program to progress further along (or even
to the end of) its timeline without regulatory intervention lest it be accused of
hindering implementation.
D. Liability Models
With safety regulation politicized, it may be that the first formal scrutiny
of the safety of EMRs, and their appropriate use, will take place in the courts.
I first raised these issues a decade ago, arguing that "likely adverse event
scenarios that will result from technologically-mediated diagnosis, treatment
and care will severely test our current torts operational rules, particularly those
that lie at the intersection of malpractice and products liability."2 2 4 Hoffman
and Podgurski have clearly detailed the types of allegations and causes of
action that likely will play out.2 25
A recent case commentary posted on AHRQ's Morbidity and Mortality
Rounds is illustrative of the complex issues. A nursing home resident suffering
from dementia was admitted to a hospital. As a prelude to removing his feeding
tube, the care team increased his dose of anticoagulant. Subsequently, the team
decided to schedule an echocardiogram to determine whether to continue with
the anticoagulant. The attending physician instructed a resident to temporarily
stop the anticoagulant. The latter initiated the order on the CPOE application
on her smartphone but was interrupted by a personal text message. The patient
221 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRA-
TION STAFF-MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS 7 (July 21, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/
medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm263280.htm.
Id. at 10.
223 Raths, supra note 217 (quoting Dr. Shuren).
224See generally Nicolas P. Terry, When the Machine That Goes "Ping" Causes Hann: Default Torts
Rules and Technologically-Mediated Health Care Injuries, 46 ST. Louis U.L.J. 37 (2002); see also
Thomas v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 216, 218 (D.D.C. 1987).
The records were summary in nature and did not document plaintiff's condition to the degree
necessary for the proper monitoring of his condition. For instance, the records did not adequately
describe the location or the relative progression of the swelling, nor provide details of any
medical examinations performed. Thus the records did not provide the next attending physician
with adequate information for him to perform his duties.
Id.
225See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, E-Health Hazards: Provider Liability and Electronic
Health Record Systems, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523, 1533-52 (2009).
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continued to receive an elevated dose of anticoagulant. Fortunately, the patient
survived subsequent emergency open heart surgery.2 2 6
This offers a robust legal hypothetical. In actions against the healthcare
providers, what types of evidence would be referenced in setting the pro-
fessional standard of care for modem workflows incorporating HIT products
(including system choice, training, and transition planning). Similarly, as-
suming a design defect allegation against the CPOE application seller for, say,
failing to include a persistent warning of failure to complete an entry, what
design (in particular, human factors) norms would be addressed by expert
evidence.
Of course, a limited set of granular norms for the performance of an
EMR is set forward in the Certification Standards.22 7 These "criteria establish
the required capabilities and specify the related standards and implementa-
tion specifications that certified electronic health record (EHR) technology
will need to include to, at a minimum, support the achievement of mean-
ingful use Stage 1."228 For example, sub-part B incorporates a large number
of detailed external standards and specifications regarding EMR function-
ality. Similarly, the detailed MU requirements create admittedly minimum
standards for providers using EMRs.2 2 9
As the MU program has progressed and EMR use has grown, an array
of quite detailed information about HIT and its use has been published. For
example, a comprehensive guide for reducing adverse results arising from
EMR use is available from AHRQ. The guide addresses the avoidance of
unintended consequences (such as by reviewing skipped or rejected alerts),
understanding such consequences (such as by using analytical frameworks),
and remediating adverse results (such as by changing processes).2 30 It seems
unassailable that such published work will inform the norms applicable to
health care providers in their use of HIT. While such norms may influence how
courts set standards for those who actually use EMRs, more difficult questions
arise with regard to providers who have not implemented them and who face
226.John Halamka, Order Interrupted by Text: Multitasking Mishap, WEB M&M, Dec. 2011, available
at http://webmm.ahrq.gov/case.aspx?caselD=257; for other CPOE errors, see Adelman et al., Under-
standing and Preventing Wrong-Patient Electronic Orders: A Randomized Controlled Trial, J. AM.
MED. INFORMATiCS Ass'N 1-6 (June 29, 2012).
227 Health Information Technology: Initial Set of Standards, Implementation Specifications, and Certifi-
cation Criteria for Electronic Health Record Technology, 45 C.F.R. § 170 (2010).
228 Id.
229 Medicare and Medicaid Programs, Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, 42 C.FR. §§ 412,413,
422, & 495 (2012).
230 Spencer S. Jones et al., Guide to Reducing Unintended Consequences of Electronic Health Records,
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE REs. & QUALITY (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.ucguide. org/index.html.
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professional negligence allegations, arguing that HIT implementation would
have avoided an adverse result.2 3 '
Whatever the answer is today, a separate question arises when carrots
turn to sticks in 2015 and it becomes government policy to penalize providers
for failing to make MU of available technologies. At that point, providers likely
will find it increasingly difficult to resist the argument that it is malpractice
not to have a functioning EMR.
Going forward and assuming eventual Class 3 FDA regulation,2 3 2 the
liability picture will be affected by federal preemption rules, specifically the
medical device amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 23 3
Broad preemption of state products liability claims is granted to products sub-
ject to premarket approval.23 4 In contrast, preemption generally does not apply
to medical devices that are "substantially equivalent" to existing devices that
attract the more limited section 510(k) premarket notification process.2 3 5 Prod-
ucts claims based on a manufacturing defect theory alleging seller violation of
FDA standards also may survive preemption.2 3 6 Significantly, The Food and
Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 instructs the FDA to
create a "strategy and recommendations on an appropriate, risk-based regula-
tory framework pertaining to health information technology . . . that promotes
innovation, protects patient safety, and avoids regulatory duplication."2 33
It is a sad commentary on today's state of EMR design that EMR ven-
dors seem to favor the inclusion of some controversial clauses in their sup-
ply contracts. First, they frequently use "gag" clauses that limit health care
providers from disclosing product errors or inadequate performance.2 3 8 Sec-
ond, some contracts include "hold-harmless" clauses requiring health care
providers to indemnify EMR manufacturers in case of adverse results. Both
types of clauses have been criticized in reports from the American Medical
231 See generally Howard Melvis, Electronic Medical Records: Liability Is Lurking, AAOS Now, July
2010, available at http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosnow/julI0/managing5.asp.
232
See supra text accompanying notes 218-223.
233 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(2006).
234See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
235 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
2See Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2012).
Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 618, 126
Stat. 993, 1063 (2012).






Informatics Association239 and the IoM24 as running counter to public policy
and hindering safety-improvement. In the words of Koppel and Kreda: "While
it is proper that HIT vendors should be held harmless from others' failures,
being held responsible for their own errors will bring incentives into balance
and enable learned intermediaries to focus on patient care, rather than on
coping with product inadequacies or failures."2 4 '
Although regulatory and liability models can be slow to evolve and
frequently are clumsy in their application, in this instance they may push
the EMR vendors towards higher quality and better usability faster than the
market or escalating MU requirements.
CONCLUSION
Criticism of the MU program seems somewhat churlish; harsh treatment
of ONC's thoughtful approach to public policy. After all, the MU program was
something of an accident of circumstance. When faced with market failure,
it is not the American preference to turn to government. But, in 2009, a
financial crisis requiring public works style investment happened upon some
pre-drafted legislation from the prior administration.2 4 2 ONC could have made
it "easy" on the industry and simply mailed checks to any provider who sent in
a facially reasonable request to support an EMR project. Instead, the agency
embarked on a far more challenging journey to change the way medicine is
practiced. So framed, and with such ambition, MU is less about channeling
paper records to electronic platforms and more about moving providers to a
new HIT ecosystem.
But critical analysis remains appropriate. The challenge in assessing
the progress of the MU program is in finding an appropriate metric. Is the
registration of 50% of physicians and 75% of hospitals a success or a failure?
Do we judge the reinvention of health care by reference to the forward-
thinking HIT deployed by HIMSS's overachieving Stage 7 hospitals 24 3 or by
its almost total absence from small, rural facilities? From another perspective,
metrics inherent in the mechanics of MU (registrations, attestations, and the
239 Kenneth W. Goodman et al., Challenges in Ethics, Safety, Best Practices, and Oversight Regarding
HIT Vendors, Their Customers, and Patients: A Report of an AMIA Special Task Force, 18 J. AM. MED.
INFORMATIcS Ass'N 77, 77-78 (2011), available at http://jamia.bmj.com/content/18/1/77.full.pdf+html.
240 INST. MED., HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY: BUILDING SAFER SYSTEMS FOR BETTER
CARE 2 (2011), available at http://www.iom.edul-/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Health-IT/
HealthlTandPatientSafetyreportbrieffinaLnew.pdf.
241 Ross Koppel & David Kreda, Health Care Information Technology Vendors' "Hold Harmless" Clause,
301 J.A.M.A. 1276, 1278 (2009).
242 E.g., Wired for Health Care Quality Act, S. 1693, 1 10th Cong. (2007).
243 See HIMSS Analytics Stage 7 Award-Paperless and Proud of It!, HIMSS ANALYTICS (2012), http://
www.himssanalytics.org/hcproviders/stage7Award.asp.
40
MEANINGFUL ADOPTION OF EMRs
like) are perhaps irrelevant if the success or failure of the program is reframed
by reference to its impact on the next generation of physicians, the subsidy
investment perhaps being viewed as worthwhile for exposing so many medical
students and residents to HIT.
Such generous caveats aside, there are several reasons for concern about
the program as it reaches its midpoint. Increased deployment and education
notwithstanding, the ARRA-sourced subsidy remains the major driver for
EMR adoption.2" Ezekiel Emanuel reminds us that the MU program was
built on an escalating model, whereby "you start with modest requirements
to get physicians and hospitals on board and then escalate them to ensure
a more robust system." However, as he comments: "People like me worry
whether the escalation will really occur."2 4 5 Much of the pushback against
Stage 2 described above focuses on some key functionality, such as data shar-
ing and exchange. Like Stage 1 before it, Stage 2 has now been placed on
an extended and far more conservative timeline. If the number of providers
capable of complying with advanced MU requirements remains modest, the
2015 penalties may begin to look politically untenable. CMS could find itself
penalizing poorer and often rural providers that make up a disproportionate
part of the safety net. Hardship exemptions from 2015 penalties have been
mooted. 246 A recent KPMG report put the MU program into a broader context:
"While some projects have ultimately been successful, more often they have
lost momentum after the pilot phase, collapsed under their own complexity,
or become irredeemable thanks to spiraling implementation costs."24 7 Specif-
ically, the report noted retreats by the governments of The Netherlands and
the UK, "reflecting the significant challenges faced by some of the larger,
government-led programs." 24 8
This article has also discussed a performance gap between the stated
expectations of the MU architects and the EMRs that are currently installed
in most health care facilities. If accurate, the gap helps to explain the inability
of too many providers to meet Stage 1, let alone Stage 2, requirements. It is
also consistent with a looming safety problem that almost inevitably will lead
to FDA regulation of EMRs.
244 Molly Merrill, Survey Reveals Docs' Perceptions of EHRs as Potential Buyers, Users,
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/survey-reveals-docs-
perceptions-ehrs- potential-buyers- users.245
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suggested a hardship rule in a proposed amendment to the e-prescribing incentives. Id.






In 2004, President Bush set a 10-year timetable for the introduction of
EMRs. Eight years later, ONC Coordinator Mostashari provided this update,
stating that, "[i]n 2016, it's going to be the rare to find a doctor without
EHRs."24 9 Unfortunately, the data we have today suggest that in 2016, many
providers will be without even basic EMR technologies. This group will in-
clude ineligible providers, many poorly funded or rural facilities, and a swathe
of older physicians who have not switched away from paper and are unlikely
to make the EMR leap during their careers. Even narrowing the focus to EMR-
equipped providers, 2016 is unlikely to demonstrate much sophisticated use
of HIT. The percentage of EMRs that are capable of sophisticated data sharing
with other HIT modules, such as CDS or interoperability across data inter-
changes, may continue to be troublingly small. Unless we are very careful
(or lucky), the MU program may end up not so much fixing health care, but
confirming one of its fundamental problems; a growing discrepancy between
high performing, well-funded vertically integrated models or teaching hos-
pitals and the lower quality providers responsible for the care of millions of
other Americans.
249 Diana Manos, Mostashari: "Keep Our Eyes on the Prize," HEALTHCAREIT NEWS, Apr. 26, 2012, http://
www.healthcareitnews.con/news/mostashari-keep-our-eyes-prize.
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